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National Rail and Tourism from the Russo-Japanese War 
to the Asia-Pacific War: The Rise and Fall of a Business 
Approach to Rail Management1
OIKAWA Yoshinobu
Through analysis of changes in the passenger transport policies of national 
rail from the Russo-Japanese War to the Asia-Pacific War, this article provides 
insights into how war affected the shape of tourism, in particular rail-based 
tourism, of modern Japan. It finds that international tourism increased and 
domestic travel/tourism spread between the Russo-Japanese War and the 
interwar period, giving rise to Japan’s greatest pre-1945 tourism boom. This 
boom continued despite Japan’s deepening isolation in the 1930s following 
the Manchuria (Mukden) Incident and withdrawal from the League of 
Nations. Head of sales at the Railway Bureau’s Transportation Department, 
Kinoshita Yoshio, established a “business approach” to the transportation 
system, which put the promotion of leisure travel at the center of policy 
decisions. However, following the full-scale outbreak of the second Sino-
Japanese War in 1937, the situation changed dramatically. Use of the rail 
network for military-related transportation surged, and long-distance limited 
express services, sleepers, and dining cars were phased out as the national 
railway switched to a national policy-oriented transportation system. While 
mountain climbing, pilgrimage to sacred sites, and other forms of travel 
were encouraged, the idea of “travel for the sake of travel” that underpinned 
the interwar tourism boom was abandoned. As this demonstrates, war was 
a productive force in the development of mass tourism—especially pleasure 
tourism—until the outbreak of full-scale war with China; but the beginning 
of the Asia-Pacific War, while giving rise to new forms of tourism seen to 
benefit the wartime state, had a generally restrictive effect on tourism.
Keywords: National Railway, Russo-Japanese War, second Sino-Japanese 
War, Asia-Pacific War, Kinoshita Toshio, tourism boom, democratization of 
travel (tourism), international tourism promotion, national policy
1 This work was supported in part by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 17H02253.
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Introduction
In January 2016, a temporary exhibition on a fascinating, if somewhat uncommon, theme 
opened at the National Museum of Modern Art, Tokyo. Entitled Yōkoso Nihon e: 1920–30 
nendai no tsūrizumu to dezain ようこそ日本へ: 1920–30年代のツーリズムとデザイン (Visit 
Japan: Tourism Promotion in the 1920s and 1930s), the exhibition focused on the so-
called interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s, when Japan enjoyed a massive tourist boom 
in the years before the outbreak of World War II. During this period, the Japan Tourist 
Bureau (Japan Tsūrisuto Byūrō ジャパン・ツーリスト・ビューロ )ー, established in 1912, and 
the Board of Tourist Industry (Kokusai Kankō Kyoku 国際観光局), established in 1930, 
made efforts to increase inbound tourist numbers. At the same time, public and private 
organizations such as the Ministry of Railways (Tetsudōshō 鉄道省), the South Manchuria 
Railway Company (Minami Manshū Testudō 南満洲鉄道), Japan Mail Shipping Line 
(Nippon Yūsen 日本郵船), and the Osaka Shosen shipping company (Ōsaka Shōsen Kaisha 
大阪商船会社, or OSK) mobilized a large cohort of painters, illustrators, and designers. 
Artists such as Yoshida Hatsusaburō 吉田初三郎, Sugiura Hisui 杉浦非水, Kita Renzō 
北蓮蔵, and Itō Jūnzō 伊藤順三 produced tourist posters, which helped to transmit an image 
of “beautiful Japan” (utsukushii Nihon 美しい日本) to international audiences. As the Visit 
Japan exhibition guide argues, by paying attention to such posters, we can understand the 
prevalent self-images of imperial Japan during the 1920s and 1930s.2 
The tourist boom that occurred during these decades involved not only foreign tourists, 
but larger numbers of Japanese too. After the Russo-Japanese War and through World War I, 
Japan experienced massive urban development. In cities like Tokyo and Osaka, this entailed 
an expansion of professional, salaried occupations, including office workers, civil servants, 
doctors, lawyers, and teachers. This new middle class increasingly saw tourism as a regular 
part of their lives. Akai Shōji 赤井正二, discussing the tourist practices that emerged in the 
modern period, argues that a shift in the motivations for a journey was key. Rather than 
leisure activities being subsidiary to a business trip or a visit to relatives and friends, “travel” 
itself became the objective, and practitioners enjoyed a large degree of freedom in choosing 
when, where, and with whom they traveled. The idea of “travel for travel’s sake” took root, 
which led in turn to the popularization of travel (tourism) as a mass social practice.3
One obvious reason for this tourist boom was the expansion of transportation 
infrastructures, especially rail and steamship links, across East Asia. Table 1 compares the 
length of operational rail tracks in Japan with Great Britain, the U.S., Germany, France, 
and Italy between 1926 and 1938. Although those in Europe and America show little 
change, the rail network in Japan expanded from 12,864 to 18,179 kilometers. This 40 
percent increase in the rail network between World War I and World War II was one factor 
in the interwar tourist boom. On the one hand, rail moved large numbers of people at high 
speeds over long distances, and thus it helped expand the range and scope of tourist travel; 
on the other hand, tourists were an important source of revenue for the rail industry, and 
policies to attract them were thus developed.4
2 Kida 2016, pp. 6–10.
3 See Akai 2016, especially the introduction.
4 See Soyama 2003. Soyama uses colonial Taiwan as a case study to explore how the improvement of 
transportation infrastructure through the building of rail lines led to the development of modern tourism in 
the territory.
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Table 1. International comparison of operational rail lines. 
year japan
great 
britain u.s. germany france italy
1926 12,864 31,066 401,403 53,336 41,679 16,549
1927 13,394 31,056 405,087 53,546 41,682 16,482
1928 13,695 31,029 406,170 53,667 41,725 16,547
1929 14,152 31,004 408,256 53,820 41,845 16,640
1930 14,575 31,001 409,585 53,821 42,394 16,720
1931 15,014 30,957 418,246 53,857 42,541 16,846
1932 15,372 30,929 416,927 53,885 42,536 16,886
1933 15,845 30,913 387,259 53,880 42,609 16,904
1934 16,535 30,854 384,555 53,883 42,443 16,959
1935 17,138 30,798 382,915 54,240 42,451 —
1936 17,530 30,695 381,219 54,375 42,473 16,653
1937 17,934 30,663 378,802 54,464 42,490 16,840
1938 18,179 30,643 377,363 61,328 42,612 16,170
Note: Data on Britain, U.S.A., Germany, and France are from Tetsudōshō Unyu Kyoku 1940. Data on Japan 
are from Unyu Keizai Kenkyū Sentā 1979.
In the case of Japan, figures are for national rail lines only and are calculated on the length of tracks in 
operation at the end of the year. For rail lines elsewhere, figures show the average length of tracks in operation 
that year.
This paper investigates passenger service policy developed by the national rail 
authorities over a period stretching from the Russo-Japanese War, through World War I, 
to the second Sino-Japanese War and the Asia-Pacific War. It seeks to assess and clarify the 
extent to which war affected tourism. Significant previous studies by Takaoka Hiroyuki 
高岡裕之 (1993) and Kenneth J. Ruoff (2010) have considered this problem in terms of the 
1937–1945 period. Noting the continuation of leisure activities such as mountain climbing 
and hiking into the war years, Takaoka suggests that tourism did not continue in spite of 
the war; rather, tourism expanded because of the war. Similarly, while Ruoff acknowledges 
that the outbreak of all-out conflict between Japan and China on 7 July 1937 did result in a 
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change in the direction of rail policy, he underlines the fact that tourism was still booming 
into 1940.5 These are fascinating, and important, findings. However, they are mainly based 
on studies of the years after 1937, and Ruoff especially focuses on 1940, the year of the 
2,600th anniversary of the founding of the imperial line. As a result, the real damage that 
the second Sino-Japanese War dealt to tourism is arguably underplayed. In order to evaluate 
accurately the influence of the war in China on tourism, it is useful to investigate a broader 
span of time. 
By taking a wide historical perspective, from the early development of rail passenger 
services after the Russo-Japanese War through the interwar tourist boom and into the Asia-
Pacific War, this paper reveals the second Sino-Japanese War as a turning point, generating 
a significant transformation in the direction of national rail policy.6 While it is clear that rail 
transportation was used for both leisure and military purposes, the beginning of full-scale 
war in China resulted in an increase in the relative importance of military transportation 
and a concomitant reduction in the range and size of rail travel for tourism. In arguing that 
leisure travel underwent an undeniable and important change from 1937, this paper does 
not claim that tourism disappeared, nor does it argue for the incompatibility of tourism and 
war. Rather, its interest lies in clarifying how tourism changed with the beginning of war, 
and the relationship of these changes to the direction of national rail policy.
Passenger Services and the Formation of the Imperial Rail Network
Passenger Services and the Russo-Japanese War
In January 1904, just prior to the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), a law 
came into effect that mobilized all railways—public and private—for military use (Tetsudō 
Gunji Kyōyō Rei 鉄道軍事供用令). During the first Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), the 
cost of rail travel for the military had been set at half the regular rate, but for this later 
conflict, first and second-class tickets were fixed at 1 sen 銭 per mile, and third-class tickets 
at 5 rin 厘 per mile. Companies such as Nippon Railway (Nippon Tetsudō 日本鉄道) and 
San’yō Railway (San’yō Tetsudō 山陽鉄道) that operated extensive rail networks found 
military utilization to be a profitable venture.7 
Military rail transportation negatively impacted passenger services for nonmilitary 
purposes as it entailed intensive and large-scale movement of troops and supplies. During 
peacetime, a journey by train from Tokyo to Osaka on the Tōkaidō 東海道 line took 14 
hours 13 minutes, and 14 hours 39 minutes from Ueno 上野 to Morioka 盛岡 on Nippon 
Railway. During the Russo-Japanese War, these journeys could take up to 26 hours.8 At 
the same time, rail authorities tried to reduce the disruption to nonmilitary travelers where 
they could: lulls in military transportation were used to run regular passenger services, for 
5 Takaoka 1993, p. 10. Ruoff 2010.
6 Nakamura Hiroshi 中村宏 explores divergences in approaches to tourism between different branches of 
government in this period, including the Ministry of Railways and the Home Ministry (Naimushō 内務省). 
But he argues for the second Sino-Japanese War as a turning-point in the underlying direction of tourism 
policy, when international tourism came to be understood increasingly as a useful propaganda tool, rather than 
primarily in economic terms; see Nakamura 2007. Also, see the paper by Andrew Elliott in this special issue.
7 Tetsudō Jihō Kyoku 1904.
8 Ōe 1976, p. 515.
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rail company or line effects on passenger numbers*
Hokkaido Railway (北海道鉄道 ) Unknown.
Nippon Railway No decline in passengers to shrines, temples, or sightseeing spots. 
Kōzuke Railway (上野鉄道 ) Decrease on some lines, increase on others (for example, lines to Yamana 
Hachimangū 山名八幡宮 and Ichinomiya Nukisaki Jinja 一宮貫前神社 
shrines). Overall, no change. 
Jōmō Railway (上毛鉄道 ) Increase evident.
Kawagoe Railway (川越鉄道 ) No decline.
Sōbu Railway ((総武鉄道 ) Passenger visiting shrines stable. Sightseers increased slightly.
Bōsō Railway (房総鉄道 ) Slight decline.
Narita Railway (成田鉄道 ) 15 percent passenger increase to Fudō 不動 temple.
Kōbu Railway (甲武鉄道 ) Slight decrease.
Nanao Railway (七尾鉄道 ) 50 percent decline on routes to shrines, temples, or sightseeing spots 
compared to average year.
Ōmi Railway (近江鉄道 ) 30 percent decline on routes to shrines and temples. Few sightseers 
evident. However, surveys carried out at shrines and temples suggest a 
50 percent increase in visitors. Need to observe conditions more widely.
Sangū Railway (参宮鉄道 ) A clear decline, but difficult to quantify.
Kyoto Railway (京都鉄道 ) Increase in sightseers from last year.
Nankai Railway (南海鉄道 ) Increase in passengers to shrines, temples, and sightseeing spots.
San’yō Railway Approx. 50 percent decline in leisure passengers, but significant increase 
in military transportation. More than 50 percent increase overall.
Iyo Railway (伊予鉄道 ) No noticable decline.
Hakata-wan Railway (博多湾鉄道 ) 20 percent decline in sightseers, but numbers were exceptionally high 
last year.
Ōu line (奥羽線 ) Approx. 50 percent decrease compared to average year.
Chūōtō line (中央東線 ) Approx. 50 percent decline in passengers to shrines, temples, and sight-
seeing spots on usual year.
Tōkaidō line (東海道線 ) Decrease but difficult to quantify.
Kagoshima line ( 鹿児島線 ) Compared to average year, 30 percent passenger increase to shrines and 
temples. Slight decline in tourists to countryside, but visitors traveling to 
see forestry and mining works have been growing yearly, and particularly 
increased after the start of the war. No change in passengers to onsen.
Taiwan Railway (台湾鉄道 ) No reduction.
Table 2. Report on railway usage of travelers to sightseeing 
spots, shrines, and temples during the Russo-Japanese War. 
* Apart from where noted, change is relative to previous year.
Source: Tetsudō Jihō Kyoku 1905a, 1905b, 1905c.
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example, while “out of service” trains returning from troop disembarkation were put to 
civilian use.9 
In May 1905, the Railway Times Bureau (Tetsudō Jihō Kyoku 鉄道時報局) investigated 
the impact of wartime disruption on travelers to sightseeing spots, shrines, and temples on 
sixteen private lines, four government-run lines, as well as rail lines in Taiwan. The results of 
this qualitative survey (see table 2) show quite diverse effects: San’yō Railway reported that 
leisure passenger numbers were half that of usual, Nippon Railway reported that there was 
no reduction in numbers, and the government-run Tōkaidō line that numbers were reduced 
but to an uncertain degree. Narita Railway noted a 15 percent increase in passengers 
traveling to the Narita Fudō 成田不動 temple compared to the same period the previous 
year, while Nanao Railway, in the Hokuriku 北陸 region, noted a 50 percent decrease from 
the usual number of leisure passengers.
By the time the Russo-Japanese War broke out, it was possible to travel by train from 
Aomori 青森 in the north of Honshu to Shimonoseki 下関 in the south, and the main naval 
ports like Kure 呉 and Sasebo 佐世保 were already fully connected to the rail network. 
Therefore, when compared to the first Sino-Japanese War, military transportation by rail 
was possible on a much larger scale.10 Nevertheless, it appears that the impact of rail’s 
military mobilization on leisure passengers was, even during a conflict termed the first total 
war, relatively small.
In March 1906, six months after the formal cessation of conflict between Japan and 
Imperial Russia, the Railway Nationalization Act (Tetsudō Kokuyū Hō 鉄道国有法) was 
enacted. From October 1906 to October 1907, seventeen private rail companies, including 
Hokkaido Colliery and Railway (Hokkaidō Tankō Tetsudō 北海道炭礦鉄道), Nippon 
Railway, Kansai Railway (Kansai Tetsudō 関西鉄道), San’yō Railway, and Kyushu Railway 
(Kyūshū Tetsudō 九州鉄道), were brought under national control. This law created in one 
fell swoop a massive national rail company that possessed 3,004 miles of track (or 4,844 
kilometers, including lines not yet in operation), 1,118 locomotives, 3,067 passenger cars, 
28,884 freight cars, and 48,409 employees.11 Concomitant with this takeover, structural 
reorganization was carried out. The national railway was first placed, in April 1907, under 
the control of a new department in the Ministry of Communications (Teishinshō 逓信省), 
the Imperial Government Railways Department (Teikoku Tetsudōchō 帝国鉄道庁). Then, 
in December of the following year, control was given to the Railway Bureau (Tetsudōin 鉄道院), 
a department under direct cabinet supervision. Finally, from May 1920, the national railway 
was administered by the Ministry of Railways.12
National Rail and Transportation Reform
In a diary entry from 30 June 1905, the president of Mitsui Bussan 三井物産, Masuda 
Takashi 益田孝, records a request he made to Hara Takashi 原敬 and Matsuda Masahisa 
松田正久 of the Seiyūkai 政友会 political party to “nationalize the railways and install 
9 Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō 1971a, p. 564.
10 Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō 1971a, p. 79.
11 Oikawa 2014, pp. 211–12.
12 After coming under control of the Ministry of Railways, the national railway was commonly referred to as 
“Japanese Government Railways” in English-language publications.
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broad-gauge tracks” should reparations be obtained after the war.13 There was support for 
such a plan in economic circles as well: after consideration of the prospects for postwar 
development, demands were made for the unification of the rail transportation systems 
through nationalization, and the strengthening of transportation capacity via a broad-gauge 
railway policy. The latter was not realized, but in unifying the rail network, nationalization 
brought immediate benefits to passenger as well as freight services, as figure 1 shows. 
A key reason for the expansion of the network was revisions to the fare system for rail 
passengers. Before nationalization, each rail company set its own fares, resulting in nineteen 
different systems. But from 1 November 1907, the new national railway unified rates and 
decreased fares across its network. In moves designed to benefit long-haul rail passengers 
directly, fares were reduced at the rate of one rin for every mile traveled on journeys over 
fifty miles, and prices for first- and second-class tickets were lowered. In addition, from 
April 1906, a new fare system for express trains came into effect, first on the Tōkaidō main 
line between Shinbashi 新橋 and Kobe, then later on the San’in 山陰, Kyushu, Tōhoku 東北, 
and Hokkaido lines. In June 1912, with the opening of the Shinbashi–Shimonoseki limited 
express service, this system was revised again. While the fare on limited express trains rose 
after 400 miles of travel, on regular express trains rates were fixed irrespective of distance. 
At the same time, other services for rail passengers were introduced, including season tickets 
(teiki jōsha ken 定期乗車券), coupon tickets (kaisū ken 回数券), and group tickets (dantai 
jōsha ken 団体乗車券). Season and coupon tickets were convenient for those commuting to 
work or school from the suburbs by train, as well as leisure travelers, but group fares were 
expressly designed for the benefit of those traveling long distances by rail.14
When they were first introduced, the discount offered on group fare tickets stayed 
the same throughout the year, and there was a tendency for group rail travel to be overly 
concentrated in spring, a popular time for sightseeing and other leisure pursuits. From 1913, 
the system was changed to allow shifting rates of discounts in an attempt to stimulate group 
rail travel at times of the year when non-leisure travel was slow. Group fare tickets were 
divided into different categories, including normal groups ( futsū dantai 普通団体), student 
groups (gakusei dantai 学生団体), and worker groups (shokkō dantai 職工団体). In terms 
of the latter category, fares were kept at a low price in order to give workers a chance “to 
escape the daily grind by getting out into the countryside and reviving mind and body.”15 
Other types of group fare tickets were sightseeing tickets (yūran ken 遊覧券), which were 
20 percent cheaper than regular fares, and excursion tickets (kaiyū ken 回遊券), which were 
30 to 50 percent cheaper than regular fares and were designed for “tours to scenic spots, 
shrines, temples, and the like.”16 
The Railway Bureau also began marketing the Man–Kan junyū ken 満韓巡遊券, a 
combined rail and boat ticket for round-trips to the continent. Travelers departed their 
station of choice and traveled by rail to Shimonoseki, where they picked up the connecting 
steamship to Pusan 釜山 (Kr. Busan). From there, they toured Korea and Manchuria on 
trains operated by the Government Railways of Chosen (Chōsen Sōtokufu Tetsudōkyoku 
13 Hara 1965, p. 140.
14 Tetsudōshō 1920, pp. 159–64.
15 Tetsudōshō 1920, pp. 164–66.
16 Tetsudōshō 1920, p. 168.
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Source: Unyu Keizai Kenkyū Sentā 1979.
Figure 1. Increases in rail passenger services from 1900 to 1939.
Sen 朝鮮総督府鉄道局線) and South Manchuria Railways. Finally, boarding an OSK 
steamship in Dalian 大連 (Jp. Dairen), travelers returned to Japan via Shimonoseki, Moji 
門司, or Kobe. These tickets were valid for sixty days, and were 30 percent cheaper than 
the regular fare.17 Through the process of rail nationalization, the Railway Bureau assumed 
control not only of domestic rail lines, but also of rail lines in Korea and Manchuria. As a 
result, it was possible to establish tourist routes that connected formal and informal colonial 
possessions with the main islands.
Compared to rail systems in industrialized Western nations, transportation capacity in 
Japan was limited by narrow-gauge tracks and a plethora of slopes and bends. Nevertheless, 
after nationalization, capacity was strengthened through four major reforms: 1. increased 
speed of trains; 2. increased number of services; 3. improved precision of timetables; and 4. 
improved equipment. In particular, with unifi cation of the network, systems for managing 
timetables and the utilization of carriages were simplifi ed, allowing an increase in the number 
of through-services and a reduction in stopping times. As noted above, express services also 
went into operation on the trunk line, beginning with the Tōkaidō main line and the San’yō 
and Tōhoku lines. Then, from May 1912, a limited express service started between Shinbashi 
and Shimonoseki, reducing the journey from twenty-nine to twenty-six hours.18
The number and range of passenger services increased signifi cantly as well. There were 
4,376 miles of track in operation for passenger services in 1907. Less than ten years later, in 
1916, this had increased to 5,551 miles. Over this period, the number of services increased 
by 27 percent, leading to claims that, “Our railway has achieved equality with the railways 
17 Tetsudōin 1912, pp. 5–6. This tour could also be taken in the opposite direction. See McDonald in this 
special issue for analyses of travelers to the continent on this and similar tours.
18 Tetsudōshō 1920, pp. 133–34.
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of the great powers in the West.” The line between Shinbashi and Kanagawa, for example, 
saw an increase from forty-three to forty-six daily round trips from 1908 to 1913. When 
electrification of the line was completed in 1915, the number of round trips jumped to 110 
per day. Indeed, electrification allowed much more frequent services, and thus led to a rapid 
expansion in operations.19 
Nationalization also resulted in properly scheduled services. Before this, delays were 
seen as “an almost normal condition” of some lines; but these decreased after nationalization 
with the beginning of through services. In order to achieve the “convenience and satisfaction 
of rail travelers,” national rail authorities overhauled the system to keep trains on time, 
and refunded fares or offered free return tickets to the departure station when delays led to 
missed connections. In the case of extraordinary delays on express trains, the price of tickets 
was refunded.20
Furthermore, nationalization led to attempts to improve the condition of equipment 
and machinery on the rail network. From 1909, it became policy to fit all new carriages 
with bogies, and to increase the size of cars and seating. Third-class carriages, previously 
furnished with wooden or tatami-covered seats, were upgraded with fabric-covered seating, 
and oil lamps replaced with electric lights. Limited express trains between Tokyo and 
Shimonoseki were fitted with sleeping and glass-lined observation cars, earning them the 
accolade of the “best-equipped passenger trains in Japan.” Heating systems using steam 
were installed on express trains on the Hokkaido line from October 1900 and, by the 
time nationalization was complete, these had been extended to the passenger and mixed 
passenger-freight trains on almost all other lines as well. Cooling systems, using electric 
fans, were previously offered in sleeping cars and dining cars, but nationalization led to 
them being installed in first-class carriages on principal services. Other measures to increase 
the comfort and convenience of passengers were directed at overnight rail travelers: first-
class sleeping cars were coupled to trunk line trains, and second-class sleeping cars to trains 
on the Tōkaido, San’yō, Kyushu, Tōhoku, and other lines. In addition, dining cars were 
provided on through and express services on main lines.21
Improvements to the network and trains led to increasing use of rail transportation 
by visitors to expositions and fairs, or for group trips to shrines and temples. According 
to the Ministry of Railways, “As leisure travel makes up a remarkable share of passenger 
services on Japan’s railways, and is a significant source of its income, we are working on 
developing this market further, reducing prices, adding extra trains for package tours, and 
increasing convenience for all users.” March to early May were “the busiest time of the year 
for tourists,” and large numbers of group and independent visitors traveled to shrines and 
temples in Ise 伊勢, Kyoto, and elsewhere to participate in festivals and memorial services. 
Yet summer as well saw droves of people “escaping the dirt and noise of the city (tojin 都塵)” 
for the mountains and sea. And come fall, the trains were busy with farmers taking time 
off to travel in the comfortable months of October and November. Finally, during the New 
19 Tetsudōshō 1920, pp. 134–36. 
20 Tetsudōshō 1920, pp. 134–35.
21 Tetsudōshō 1920, pp. 137–39.
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Year holidays, “devout travelers” took to the rails to visit the Ise Grand Shrines and other 
sites of pilgrimage.22
International Rail Connections and Tourism as State Policy
With the formal cessation of the Russo-Japanese War agreed in the Treaty of Portsmouth, 
Japan acquired most of the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway (Tōshin 
Tetsudō 東清鉄道), from Lushun 旅順 (Jp. Ryojun; En. Port Arthur) to Changchun 長春, 
all accompanying rights and property, as well as the coal mines at Fushun 撫順 and Yantai 
煙台. In June 1906, the semi-governmental South Manchuria Railway Company (hereafter 
Mantetsu 満鉄) was established with a capital investment of ¥200 million to operate the 
railway and develop the region. Japan already controlled rail lines in Taiwan, such as the 
main line between Keelung 基隆 (Jp. Kīrun) and Kaohsiung 高雄 (Jp. Takao), and on the 
Korean Peninsula, such as the north–south Keifu Railway (Keifu Tetsudō 京釜鉄道) and 
Gyeongui Railway (Keigi Tetsudō 京義鉄道). The addition of lines in southern Manchuria 
created an imperial rail network stretching across East Asia from the Japanese archipelago.
Even before peace was declared, Gotō Shinpei 後藤新平, soon to become the first 
director of Mantetsu, argued for a system of territorial management in Manchuria 
centered on the rail network.23 In Gotō’s dual vision, Mantetsu could become a pivot of 
the world economy by linking Japan, Manchuria, Russia, Europe, and America in a global 
transportation network. At the same time, this would promote order and help revitalize 
China, and provide “a base from which to execute Weltpolitik.”24
Postwar developments like the Russian–Japanese accord, the bilateral promotion 
of peace in China, and the establishment of connections between Japanese and Russian 
sections of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the West Siberian Railway, and European and 
Asian train lines were all elements of Gotō’s vision for rail in East Asia. In short, he 
attempted to locate Mantetsu on a “Europe–Asia highway,” one link in a “massive trunk 
line” (dai kansen 大幹線) encircling the globe.25 In thus reorganizing the rail system in East 
Asia around Mantetsu, Gotō helped reshape the foundations of international tourism in the 
region and beyond.
Travelers greatly benefitted from the introduction of the connecting services between 
Europe and Asia that the Ministry of Railways started from 15 May 1913. Previously, the 
journey time from East Asia was 45–46 days to Paris and 50 days to London via the Indian 
Ocean and the Mediterranean, or 25 days using transcontinental railroads in America. In 
contrast, new through-routes from Tokyo were about a third faster: 13 days to Berlin, 14 
days to Paris, and 15 days to London. In addition, fares were cheaper: where a journey by 
ship could cost around ¥1,800, travel even in a first-class sleeper car was about ¥800 to 
¥900. The increased frequency of rail services, compared to ship, was another advantage: 
steamships bound for Europe departed only once a month, or two to three times at most via 
America, whereas the connecting train service operated once a week.26
22 Tetsudōshō 1920, pp. 122–23.
23 Gotō 1944, p. 76.
24 Gotō 1944, p. 71.
25 Tsurumi 2005a, pp. 580–81. See also Oikawa 2013.
26 Kokumin shinbun 1913. 
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As these changes in intercontinental rail connections were taking place, national rail 
authorities began working to attract foreign tourists to Japan and its territories. The head 
of sales, Kinoshita Yoshio 木下淑夫, and others at the Railway Bureau’s Transportation 
Department were instrumental in setting up the Japan Tourist Bureau (hereafter JTB) in 
March 1912, which soon became one of the principal agents of the interwar tourist boom. 
Four years had passed since operations began at the Railway Bureau but, in the wake of the 
end of the war with Russia, commodity prices had risen and the balance of trade turned 
unfavorable. Kinoshita hoped that growth in the number of inbound tourists would bring 
in much-needed foreign capital, encourage consumption, and lead to an increase in exports. 
In short, economic objectives were key to the establishment of JTB.27 The Economic 
Research Institute (Keizai Chōsa Kai 経済調査会) agreed that the development of a policy 
to attract foreign visitors was an urgent task. At the time of World War I, though a growth 
in exports had led to an improvement in the balance of trade, they predicted that “the end 
of war would bring a renewed surplus of imports.”28
In his arguments for the necessity of state involvement in tourism, Kinoshita focused 
on economic imperatives. Yet he also recognized the diplomatic uses of tourism. With 
military victory over Russia, negative images of Japan as an aggressive nation and a potential 
threat to the present world order had emerged in some quarters in the West. For Kinoshita, 
the main reason for such images was a lack of understanding of Japan, its politics, 
socioeconomics, and culture among the great powers. For that reason, it was necessary to 
develop and deepen mutual understanding, especially with China, Russia, and the USA. 
State involvement in tourism is necessary, Kinoshita argued, in order for “our country Japan 
to be properly understood by peoples around the world, and the position of our citizens 
raised.”29
The outbreak of World War I led to a fall in the number of foreign visitors. In 
particular, the twelve months from the end of 1914 saw a massive slump. However, the 
situation gradually improved so that over twenty thousand foreign arrivals were recorded in 
1916, and numbers eventually returned to their prewar levels.30
Tourist businesses performed consistently well, and, as seen in figure 2, foreign visitor 
numbers tended to increase throughout the interwar period despite repeated fluctuations. 
Amidst this enthusiasm for attracting international visitors, Gotō Shinpei—now head of 
the Railway Bureau—ordered the publication of an English-language travel guide in five 
volumes. An Official Guide to Eastern Asia: Trans-continental Connections between Europe and 
Asia covered Japan, colonial territories controlled by Japan and European powers, regions of 
informal empire, and independent states. The five volumes published between October 1913 
and April 1917 were divided into Manchuria and Chosen, southwestern Japan, northwestern 
Japan, China, and the East Indies.31 Defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War brought 
acknowledgement of Japan’s status as a world power, and prompted the government to 
appeal to the sympathies of Western nations. Furthermore, with rail connections between 
Europe and Asia improving through the development of the South Manchuria Railway, 
27 Kinoshita 1924, p. 153.
28 Kinoshita 1924, p. 154.
29 Kinoshita 1924, p. 171.
30 Japan Tourist Bureau 1917, p. 1.
31 Oikawa 2008.
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Siberian Railway, and Chinese Eastern Railway, demand for a guidebook series on these 
regions increased among western travelers.
An Offi  cial Guide to Eastern Asia was thoroughly researched and edited. After receiving 
Gotō’s directive, the Railway Bureau budgeted ¥200,000 for the compilation of the 
series, and between 1908 and 1909 experts were dispatched to Korea, Manchuria, China, 
Indochina, and islands in Japan’s South Pacifi c Mandate (Nan’yō Shotō 南洋諸島) to collect 
huge amounts of material. The guidebooks were fi rst written in Japanese, then translated 
into English after being checked by two British reviewers, before fi nally being published.32
The level of descriptive content, accuracy of maps, as well as the distinctive pocket-guide 
format of the red jacket, is said to have been inspired by Karl Baedeker’s well-reputed travel 
guidebooks, but the true attraction of the series stemmed from its eff ective application of 
research, in providing the latest data and most up-to-date information. 
The tourist routes established in this period ref lected common practices among 
international tourists, especially reasons to travel, not just within Japan, but also in nearby 
destinations such as Korea, Manchuria, China, and Taiwan in order to “see the unique 
climate and culture of the Orient before returning home.”33 An Official Guide to Eastern 
Asia established a reputation for itself as an “authority among Far Eastern guidebooks.” JTB 
made a contract for consignment sales with the Railway Bureau and started selling the series 
in 1915. In 1916, 1,062 copies were sold, which amounted to ¥4,832.55, approximately 
double the previous year’s sales figures.34 In 1917, JTB sold the guide through Kelly and 
Walsh, the general vending agent for Murray’s Handbook: Japan, and sales for the year 
32 Mikuriya 2007, p. 52.
33 Arai 1931, pp. 176–77.
34 Tsurumi 2005b, p. 24.
Source: Unyu Keizai Kenkyū Sentā 1979.
Figure 2. Fluctuations in foreign visitor numbers to Japan. 
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increased to 1,458 copies or ¥6,336.50.35 The Railway Bureau began revising the volumes on 
Japan following the Great Kantō earthquake, a job that was soon taken over by the Board 
of Tourist Industry, earning it the accolade of “the most trusted guide for international 
travelers.”36 
A “Business-Approach” to Rail Transportation Management
Travel Promotion Policy and the Ministry of Railways 
The Ministry of Railways was established in May 1920. After taking over jurisdiction 
of the national railway from the Railway Bureau, it initiated various policies to promote 
travel. First, it decided to provide reduced second and third-class fares for tour groups 
on special trains (rinji ressha 臨時列車) to destinations popular with domestic tourists, 
including famous sightseeing spots, shrines and temples, exhibitions, and sporting events. 
Furthermore, from October 1925, sightseeing tickets for travel around established tourist 
sites were set up and sold through JTB for the convenience of those traveling by train, 
steamboat, car, and other types of transportation. Next, between 1929 and 1936, Nihon 
annaiki 日本案内記, an eight-volume guidebook series, was published for Japanese tourists. 
This introduced scenic, historical, industrial, economic, human and cultural, geological, 
and other attractions of various regions in Japan (Hokkaido, Tōhoku, Kantō, Chūbu, 
Kinki (1 and 2), Chūgoku/Shikoku, and Kyushu). In order to ensure the accuracy of the 
content, the Ministry of Railways commissioned the historian Kuroiwa Katsumi 黒岩勝美 
and geographer Yamazaki Nao 山崎直 to oversee its compilation. The series established a 
reputation as a “detailed and scrupulous work without comparison in Japanese-language 
travel guidebooks.”37 
From September 1925, the ministry established railway tourist information centers 
one after another in major cities, which became important hubs for railway advertising and 
campaigns to attract travelers. Railway employees were dispatched to these centers to provide 
travelers with information about baggage and to sell tickets. In April 1930, the National 
Railways Travelers and Baggage Transportation Regulations (Kokuyū Tetsudō Ryokyaku 
oyobi Nimotsu Unsō Kisoku 国有鉄道旅客及荷物運送規則) were revised, resulting in the 
utilization of the metric system in transportation management and the reclassification of 
group travel from fifty people to thirty people and above. 
In addition, the trunk line network (kansenmō 幹線網) reached completion. Express 
and semi-express trains were reestablished on all these lines, and train numbers were 
increased. Prior to this, express trains on the trunk line were running in each region, with 
Tokyo and Osaka as central hubs. From this time, there were connecting routes for express 
trains to Honshu, Hokkaido, Shikoku, Kyushu, and other regions, and trains connecting to 
Siberia Railways, which ran through Korea and Manchuria, also began full-scale operation. 
In Honshu as well, a through-route express train had been running between Kobe 
and Aomori since 1925, following the opening of the north–south Japan Sea coastal line 
35 Tsurumi 2005b, p. 42; Nakagawa 1979, p. 237. Describing An Official Guide to Eastern Asia as “a product of 
the ambitions of imperial Japan,” Nagasaka Keina 長坂契那 emphasizes the nationalistic background of the 
series; however, it can also be seen as emerging out of heightened interest in the West about Asia. Nagasaka 
2011, p. 63.
36 Kokusai Kankō Kyoku 1940, pp. 103–104.
37 Nakagawa 1979, pp. 199–200.
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(Nihonkai engan jūkansen 日本海沿岸縦貫線); but with the beginning of full-scale operations 
on the Uetsu 羽越 main line, other through-route services began. On the Tōkaidō main 
line and San’yō main line, express and limited express services linking Tokyo, Osaka, and 
Kobe, as well as Tokyo and Shimonoseki, were reorganized. From July 1923, a third-class 
limited express service joined the first- and second-class limited express already in operation 
between Tokyo and Shimonoseki. From September 1929, the first- and second-class service 
was labelled Fuji 富士 and the third-class Sakura 桜. These became iconic trains given the 
task of connecting Japan to Korea and Manchuria. 
On 1 October 1930, the super-express service (chōtokkyū ressha 超特急列車), Tsubame 
燕 (Swallow), started running between Tokyo and Kobe. Its remarkable speed made it 
popular, and led to renewed appreciation among passengers of rail’s ability to move people 
rapidly. In December 1931, a Tsubame service departing ten minutes earlier than the regular 
began on a temporary basis, and was soon after included in the regular schedule. With 
only seven cars, the Tsubame could make the run between Tokyo and Kobe in nine hours, 
reducing the journey time of the limited express train by two hours and forty minutes.38 
The Tsubame was the product of technological developments made in various sectors 
of the national rail industry from the mid-1910s.39 Most important was the appearance of 
the C51-type steam locomotive. This had a driving wheel diameter of 1,750 mm, and could 
run at speeds exceeding ninety kilometers per hour even when pulling a five-hundred-ton 
carriage, making it one of the world’s most powerful engines for a narrow-gauge train. By 
adopting new technologies such as the automatic coupler, air brake, automatic traffic light, 
fifty-kilogram rail, three-axis bogie truck, and steel passenger car, this locomotive, the 
Tsubame, recorded a fixed speed of 67.6 kilometers an hour. The Tsubame demonstrated 
the strength of the railway as a high-speed, mass transportation system, and was thus an 
important component in the Ministry of Railways’ attempts to reform rail management. 
At the same time, the Ministry of Railways enhanced passenger services in other ways. 
In order to improve the ventilation and lighting inside the passenger car, they installed 
freely rotatable seats in the first-class section of express trains. In 1931, a third-class sleeper 
car was added to trains between Tokyo and Kobe. Their number increased yearly, and by 
the end of 1936 they were added to express trains on the trunk line. 
Generally, superior-class trains (yūtōsha 優等車) were reduced, and facilities for the 
benefit of a wider range of passengers were advanced. Improvements were made through 
the manufacture and remodeling of cars to combine second and third-class seating, second-
class seating and sleepers, second-class seating and dining cars, and third-class seating and 
baggage cars. Furthermore, third-class trains were upgraded and enlarged, curtains installed, 
airtightness boosted through the use of rising windows, and additional improvements were 
made in seating, lighting, and other facilities. Thus, third-class cars reached internationally 
high standards. 
On 26 November 1929, the cabinet deliberated how to promote inbound travel. As 
a result, for the first time, government recruited businesses to attract international visitors 
as part of a policy to “improve international goodwill and the balance of foreign debt.”40 
38 Harada 1988, p. 20.
39 Harada 1988, pp. 31–32.
40 Arai 1931, p. 2.
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Then, on 19 April 1930, the Board of Tourist Industry was established as an external bureau 
of the Ministry of Railways, to direct, oversee, foster, and regulate all inbound travel.41 At 
the same time, the Ministry of Railways was also active in attempts to attract international 
tourists to Japan. 
Timetable Revisions of 1 July 1937 
Military-related industrialization advanced rapidly following the Manchurian (Mukden) 
Incident on 18 September 1931, and rail traffic, in decline since the 1928 depression, 
increased again from 1932. The Japanese economy reentered a stage of positive growth from 
1933, in turn stimulating passenger and freight services. In order to boost rail traffic further, 
from 1934 the Atami 熱海 line and other important shortcut lines were opened, revisions 
were made to nationwide train schedules, and improvements were made to services and 
facilities. The latter included enhancements to train speed, passenger cars, beds, and other 
facilities; remodeling of freight cars; an increase in the number of express trains; the opening 
of new connections between Japan and Manchuria; and the expansion of discount fares. 
As a result of these measures, as well as the upturn in the economy, railway transportation 
volume continued its steady growth. 
Major changes in trunk line routes took place with the completion of the Tanna 丹那 
Tunnel in Shizuoka prefecture in December 1934. These included track alterations between 
Kōzu 国府津 and Numazu 沼津 on the Tōkaidō main line, and between Hizen-Yamaguchi 
肥前山口 and Isahaya 諫早 on the Nagasaki main line 長崎本線, as well as the opening of 
the San’yō main line between Marifu 麻里布 (currently Iwakuni 岩国) and Kushigahama 
櫛ヶ浜. Along with this, train routes were further improved, limited express and express 
services on the trunk line were increased, and its transportation capacity strengthened. 
Robust operational systems capable of responding to changing transportation demands were 
established on the Tōkaidō and San’yō main lines, where express services were increased, 
and irregular express trains departing at around ten-minute intervals were introduced 
alongside regular express trains. The speeds of express trains on all other lines were also 
improved.
Responding to the decline in demand since the depression, the Ministry of Railways 
reduced the number of superior-class trains. Except for limited express trains and some 
express trains, the ministry abolished first-class carriages on the Tōkaidō and San’yō main 
lines, and added third-class carriages to Fuji limited express services between Tokyo and 
Shimonoseki. At the same time, second-class carriages were added to the Sakura, making it 
a second and third-class limited express service. 
The business-approach of the national railway’s passenger and freight transportation 
system was, as shown above, maintained following the Mukden Incident. When schedules 
were revised on 1 July 1937, there were five limited express services (including irregular 
trains) in operation, the most in the prewar period, as well as the highest standards of 
service facilities in the so-called superior-class express and other trains. Tourism and leisure 
services such as seasonal discounts and circular trips (shūyū 周遊) continued as before, and 
these types of consumer demands on rail tended to increase rather than diminish.
41 Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbunsha 1940, p. 600.
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The schedule revision also established a new limited express named Kamome かもめ 
(Seagul) on the route between Tokyo and Kobe. The Kamome was introduced because the 
Fuji and Sakura services were extremely crowded following the Manchuria Incident. It was 
innovative in enabling a longer visiting time in the Keihin region of Tokyo, Kawasaki, and 
Yokohama than the Tsubame limited express. By this time, the transportation system for 
express and long-distance train services had reached completion.42
Questions remain about the impact that policies and campaigns to attract passengers 
had on the operation of national rail. Table 3 shows changes in passenger numbers 
and revenue of the national railway between 1920 and 1936, divided into non-regular 
(teikigai 定期外) and regular (teiki 定期) passengers. As can be seen, the number of regular 
passengers—primarily commuters to work and school—increased rapidly during this 
period. In 1920, there were over 111 million regular passengers, but in 1931 this increased 
to more than 400 million, surpassing the 386 million non-regular passengers, and making 
up 51 percent of total passengers. Despite stagnating during 1930–1935, the number of non-
regular passengers, including long-distance travelers such as tourists, increased from a little 
over 294 million in 1920 to approximately 465 million in 1936.
Regarding passenger transportation revenues, revenue from non-regular travelers 
was over ¥181 million in 1920, far higher than the almost ¥5 million received in regular 
passenger revenue, and accounted for 97 percent of total passenger transportation 
revenues. While, from this time, growth in transportation revenue from regular passengers 
continued to exceed growth in revenue from non-regular passengers, in 1936 revenues 
from non-regular passengers still accounted for 91 percent (around ¥260 million) of total 
transportation revenue. From this perspective, interwar strategies to attract passengers 
clearly made a significant contribution to the operation of the national railway.
Rail Transportation and the Shift from Passenger Promotion to National Policy
National Rail during the Second Sino-Japanese War 
Born out of the nationalization of railways following the Russo-Japanese War, the national 
rail authority established a sales-oriented passenger transportation system and actively 
developed measures to attract passengers. The schedule revision on 1 July 1937 aimed 
to further develop this sales-oriented approach. However, a few days later on 7 July, the 
situation changed dramatically when the Marco Polo Bridge incident triggered the second 
Sino-Japanese War. The full-scale dispatch of troops began on 27 July. A year later, by 
July 1938, it is estimated that two million troops and almost two and a half million tons 
of military supplies had been transported. The Tōkaidō and San’yō main lines played an 
especially central role. On average the equivalent of at least four round-trip freight trains 
ran on these lines every day.43 Following the outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese War, 
therefore, rail traffic increased sharply in response to the war situation. 
The national railway gave priority to military transportation as it made a significant 
operational transition from a “passenger promotion model” to a “national policy 
transportation model.” The transition was not total, however, as seen in the widespread 
prevalence of fare discounts for participants in a range of meetings and expositions until 
42 Harada 1988, p. 117.
43 Harada 1988, p. 126.
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1938. Indicative of this transition was the founding of the magazine, Kankō hōkoku shūkan 
観光報国週間 (Tourism Patriot Weekly), on 18 April 1938. Its purpose was “to emphasize 
the spiritual side of working in tourism, to extol and secure the Japanese spirit, and show 
a sincerity of service through the business of tourism.” This objective was also reflected in 
their slogan: “Love and protect the nation, emphasize public virtue, and train both mind 
and body” (kokudo aigo, kōtokushin kyōchō, shinshin tanren 国土愛護、公徳心強調、心身鍛
錬).44 In the 1 January 1939 edition of Tetsudō jihō 鉄道時報, the chief of the Transportation 
Division of the Ministry of Railways (Tetsudōshō Unyu Kyoku 鉄道省運輸局), Yamada 
Shinjūrō 山田新十郎, further clarified the Ministry of Railways’ transition away from travel 
promotion: 
In accordance with present circumstances, we will reform previous policy in regard to 
advertising passenger travel; newly establish a national movement aimed at appreciating 
the fatherland, respect for gods, veneration of ancestors, and mental and physical 
training; extend the period of discount fares for youth walking tours; discount or waive 
fares for bereaved family members attending extraordinary assemblies at Yasukuni 
Shrine; carry out special hiking discounts and other services during National Spirit 
General Mobilization Health Week; and through this contribute to the defense of the 
home front.45 
National railway shifted from a business model focused on the promotion of passenger 
services for profit to one that primarily saw rail transportation in terms of national policy. 
It continued to work on attracting passengers, but promotional campaigns emphasized the 
railway’s ability to mobilize citizens for activities connected to religious worship or ancestor 
veneration, as well as mental and physical training such as shrine visits, youth walking tours, 
alpine walking (teizan tozan 低山登山), and hiking.
National railway’s perception of the tourism industry also changed significantly at this 
time. After World War I, businesses such as railways, shipping lines, and hotels developed 
numerous means of converting travelers’ mobility into monetary gain. However, by 1940, 
with the formation of the Advanced Defense State (Kōdo Kokubō Kokka 高度国防国家), 
the tourism industry was given an important role. As stated in one contemporary 
newspaper, “Japanese tourism is entrusted with a great mission: to give shape to an advanced 
international consciousness that, founded on an ethnic spirit inherited from our ancestors, 
will be the driving force of a new East Asia; the extolling of our brilliant 2,600 years of 
imperial culture; and the fortification of industrial trade and the national economy.” As 
demonstrated here, tourism was endorsed in two ways: first, as a force to “promote national 
culture widely abroad and contribute to international goodwill”; and second, as a way to 
“improve the international balance of payments, not through trade but via the income 
received by welcoming tourists.”46
Not only was tourism’s cultural and political efficacy emphasized—such as its 
promotion of national culture and the auxiliary support it offered to foreign policy—but 
44 Nakamura 2007, p. 188.
45 Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō 1973, pp. 723–24.
46 Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbunsha 1940, p. 594.
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Table 3. Passenger numbers and income of the National Railways (1920–1936). 
year
non-regular passengers
passengers transported transport revenue
number 
(1,000) index percent
earnings 
(1,000¥) index percent
1920 294,390 100 73 181,603 100 97
1921 312,071 106 69 185,844 102 97
1922 338,409 115 66 199,447 110 96
1923 373,436 127 65 213,246 117 96
1924 393,245 134 62 219,986 121 95
1925 402,272 137 59 222,102 122 95
1926 420,933 143 57 223,382 123 94
1927 440,407 150 56 227,596 125 94
1928 463,945 158 55 240,362 132 93
1929 460,724 157 53 234,054 129 93
1930 418,561 142 51 211,641 117 92
1931 386,267 131 49 198,582 109 92
1932 368,305 125 47 192,894 106 91
1933 393,911 134 47 211,053 116 91
1934 417,464 142 46 226,573 125 91
1935 437,953 149 44 239,478 132 91
1936 465,358 158 44 260,138 143 91
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year
regular passengers
passengers transported transport revenue
number 
(1,000) index percent
earnings 
(1,000¥) index percent
1920 111,429 100 27 4,697 100 3
1921 142,465 127 31 6,274 134 3
1922 171,400 154 34 7,588 162 4
1923 203,036 182 35 9,039 192 4
1924 242,210 217 38 10,852 231 5
1925 274,813 247 41 12,269 261 5
1926 314,774 282 43 14,037 299 6
1927 349,542 314 44 15,544 331 6
1928 383,356 344 45 17,124 365 7
1929 402,215 361 47 18,379 391 7
1930 405,592 364 49 18,542 395 8
1931 400,955 360 51 18,338 390 8
1932 412,844 370 53 18,821 401 9
1933 447,405 402 53 20,447 435 9
1934 496,100 445 54 22,584 481 9
1935 547,088 491 56 24,854 529 9
1936 593,273 532 56 26,930 573 9
Source: Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō 1971b, pp. 84–85.
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so was its economic significance in improving the balance of payments through tourism 
revenue. Tourism, framed as an “invisible trade” and an “invisible export” was positioned 
as an important industry within national policy.47 The tourism industry, seen by policy 
makers as a way to strengthen national defense, was “increasingly charged during this state 
of emergency with duties related to broader national defense.”48
Tourism in Japan was the foundation of this vision of international tourism as foreign 
policy, and thus domestic tourism businesses were urged to “work towards the improvement 
of facilities, including accommodation, sanitation, and entertainment, encourage wholesome 
travel by the general public, cultivate public virtue, and emphasize the beautification of the 
country.” Domestic tourism businesses assumed two important roles: first, “strengthening 
national defense through the improvement of citizens’ health,” and second, “developing a 
mutual feeling of affinity among the people, cultivating local and national patriotism.”49
In November 1941, the Land Transportation Control Order (Rikuun Tōsei Rei 陸運
統制令) was enacted. Article 2 declared that, “The Minister of Railways has the right to 
refuse to transport certain persons or goods, and may designate the sequence, method, or 
other criteria for transportation.” Furthermore, Article 10 of the Passenger Hand-luggage 
Transportation Rules (Ryokyaku Tekonimotsu Unsō Kisoku 旅客手小荷物運送規則) gave 
the Ministry power to restrict or suspend the sale of passenger, express, and sleeper train 
tickets. However, this step was regarded as a “last resort,” as its abuse could result in “many 
harmful effects.” Therefore, “the only way” to transition to a national policy-oriented 
transportation system “is through a mass national movement arising out of the conscious 
spirit of the nation.” This problem was not limited to transportation; rather, across all areas 
of social life, there was an avowed necessity to light “the spark of a multitude of new order 
lifestyle movements (seikatsu shintaisei undō 生活新体制運動).”50
At the same time, the Minister of Railways, Terajima Ken 寺島健, consulted with the 
Railway Fare Council (Tetsudō Unchin Shingikai 鉄道運賃審議会) about raising passenger 
fares. In order to “fulfill the mission of the railway,” Terajima recommended “rethinking the 
rate of passenger fares.” This would “help absorb the expendable income [of passengers], as 
well as strengthen wartime financial resources, and modulate rail transportation capacity.” 
Passenger ticket prices had last been changed more than twenty years before in 1920, when 
fares were increased by around 27 percent in response to soaring inflation after World War I. 
Terajima argued now that ticket prices should be raised to bring fares into line with passage 
tax (tsūkōzei 通行税), which had increased. With passenger revenues totaling approximately 
¥700 million a year, a price increase of about 27–28 percent was expected to increase 
earnings by nearly ¥200 million.51 In order to strengthen the wartime regime, therefore, the 
national railway abandoned its low fare policy designed to attract passengers.
National Rail during the Asia-Pacific War 
On 8 December 1941, war between Japan and the United States broke out with the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor. The second Sino-Japanese War expanded into the Asia-Pacific War, 
47 Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbunsha 1940, p. 593. 
48 Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbunsha 1940, p. 594.
49 Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbunsha 1940, p. 597.
50 Takeuchi 1942a.
51 Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō 1973, p. 721.
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and the establishment of a wartime rail transportation system became urgent. Passenger fares 
were raised by about 28 percent from 1 April 1942, and the system of price reduction for 
long-distance journeys (enkyori teigensei 遠距離逓減制 ) was readjusted. Express and sleeper 
prices had already been revised up on 1 January of this year. The criteria for calculating 
express fares had changed from the conventional three-zone system (400 km, 800 km, over 
800 km) to a two-zone system (400 km and over 400 km), and the passage tax imposed on 
the express train was also increased from a general tax of 10 percent to a tiered system of 
10 percent for third class, 20 percent for second class, and 30 percent for first class. Sleeper 
prices also rose by anywhere from 10 to 50 percent, and passage taxes were newly imposed 
at 20 percent for second-class and 30 percent for first-class sleeper tickets. Table 4 shows 
passenger fares, express surcharges, and sleeper fares for journeys from Tokyo to all major 
destinations, and reveals that first and second-class fares on regular express trains between 
Tokyo and Osaka rose by nearly 40 percent.52
Takeuchi Itsuki 竹内齊, an official in the Passenger Section (Ryokyaku Ka 旅客課) of 
the Ministry of Railways’ Transportation Department, commented that the national railway 
had once “espoused travel culture ideals, and worked enthusiastically to attract passengers.” 
However, recently it had “taken the opposite course, calling for the end of unnecessary and 
low-priority travel, restricting the sale of tickets and so on, taking all kinds of measures to 
restrain travel, and starting to behave as if travel were uncultured.” He further argued that 
the policy switch that had occurred in relation to passenger service did “not itself deny the 
cultural value of travel,” but rather was aimed at “securing the capacity to transport essential 
materials for the Defense State.” For this reason, the “suppression of travel occurring at 
present is like ‘putting a mended lid on a cracked pot’ (warenabe ni tojibuta 割れ鍋にとぢ蓋): 
it fails to improve the state of passenger transportation, which at 60 percent makes up over 
half of the total amount of rail traffic.”53
In October 1942, on what happened to be the seventieth anniversary of the beginning 
of rail services in Japan, the cabinet declared a Wartime Land Transportation State of 
Emergency (Senji Rikuun Hijō Taisei 戦時陸運非常体制), which called for the complete 
transfer of responsibility for transporting large freight from shipping to rail. The Kanmon 
関門 Tunnel between Shimonoseki and Moji was opened in June 1942, and freight trains 
were able to pass under the strait from July. Additionally, following timetable revisions in 
November, the tunnel was also used by through-route passenger trains running between 
Honshu and Kyushu, including services from Tokyo to Moji or Hakata, and the Fuji 
express, which could now run from Tokyo to Nagasaki. The Sakura limited express was 
extended to run from Tokyo to Kagoshima, but in the process it was downgraded to an 
express service. Also, a considerable number of passenger services were abolished following 
the timetable revision of February 1943: first, the limited express Kamome service, and then 
all express services including Tsubame, and third-class sleeping and dining cars on all lines.
In this way, passenger services on the national railway were considerably reduced. In 
a wartime issue of the travel magazine Tabi 旅, author and former army general Sakurai 
Tadayoshi 櫻井忠温 writes about the “desire to travel during an extended war” (chōkisen-ka 
no tabikokoro 長期戦下の旅こころ). “In the past,” he continues, “the national railway used 
52 “Kokutetsu kyukō ryōkin shindai ryōkin no kaisei” 1942.
53 Takeuchi 1942b.
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to say things like ‘Hey, go to this festival tomorrow, go see this view,’ or ‘Go ahead, get on. 
We will give you a discount.’ Now they say things like, ‘Don’t let people on,’ and ‘Don’t 
bring on baggage over one shaku and one sun [isshaku issun 一尺一寸, approximately 33 cm]
square.’” 
Yet this did not mean that all travel was forbidden. Hiking and alpine walking, 
for example, were promoted: “There is nothing as enjoyable and liberating as visiting 
mountains, rivers, lakes, and fens, and exploring the emotional life and customs of people 
in the countryside.” Long-distance leisure travel by train—typified in slogans such as “Let’s 
go to Nikkō 日光 and have a drink,” or “How about going with friends to see the sights in 
Osaka?”—may have been discouraged; but short-distance trips by train for walks in the 
country and mountains were promoted as a means to train body and spirit.54 However, 
in February 1944, when the cabinet passed the Outline for Emergency Measures to Win 
the War (Kessen Hijō Sochi Yōkō 決戦非常措置要綱), permission from the Travel Control 
Office (Ryokō Tōsei Kan 旅行統制官) became necessary to purchase a ticket for all travel 
over one-hundred kilometers.55
In the shift from passenger services to military-related freight that occurred over 
these years, the following episode is illustrative. In December 1938, nearly six months after 
the outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese War, the Ministry of Railways argued that “the 
lands of Japan and Korea must be connected by all means.” This prompted the ministry to 
formulate plans, first, to construct a tunnel between Karatsu 唐津 in northern Kyushu and 
Pusan in Korea, and second, to develop a broad-gauge Tōkaidō and San’yō line to “deal 
with a sudden transportation increase,” and link Tokyo and Shimonoseki in 9 hours 50 
minutes (Tokyo to Osaka in 4 hours 50 minutes).56 The broad-gauge train between Tokyo 
and Shimonoseki was called the “bullet train” (dangan ressha 弾丸列車), and originally 
“aimed to transport travelers at high speed.”57 However, it was revised to a freight service 
in response to changing geopolitical conditions, as revealed in a comment by Minister of 
Transportation Communication (Unyu Tsūshin Daijin 運輸通信大臣), Hatta Yoshiaki 
八田嘉明: “If you consider the transportation situation of Japan, Manchuria, and China, 
both now and in the future, we need to shift to prioritizing freight, and be able to transport 
a large quantity of freight at high speed.”58 
As the wartime situation developed, and freight was prioritized over passenger services, 
the national railway switched from promoting travel to supporting national policy. This 
shift provided the context for the discouragement of long-distance leisure travel on trains 
and the encouragement of alpine walking and hiking. The change in direction gave rise to 
new forms of tourism, yet we should not lose sight of the fact that the national railway had 
by this point became a central part of military-related transportation, and had abandoned 
the business orientation that had driven the creation and development of the railway in 
previous decades. 
54 Sakurai 1942.
55 Harada 1988, pp. 215–16.
56 Asahi shinbun 20.12.1938; Asahi shinbun 28.12.1938.
57 On the “bullet train” plan, see Kushner 2016, pp. 45–46.
58 Asahi shinbun 24.1.1944. While work began on the bullet train in 1941, it was not completed. Likewise, the 
plan to build a tunnel below the Korean channel never reached completion. However, the concept of the 
bullet train is likely to have become the basis for the Tōkaidō Shinkansen developed after the war. 
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Conclusion
This paper has examined the relationship between war and tourism in relation to the 
passenger service policy of the national railway from the Russo-Japanese War to the second 
Sino-Japanese War and Asia-Pacific War. In closing, I would like to summarize what the 
study has verified. During the period of the Russo-Japanese War, there was only limited 
impact from military usage of the rail network on the transportation of general passengers, 
visitors to shrines and temples, and other nonmilitary travelers. The nationalization of 
the railways that followed the Russo-Japanese War, as well as the establishment of the 
South Manchurian Railway, led to the formation of an imperial railway network, and an 
unprecedented boom in tourism during the so-called interwar period of the 1920s and 
1930s. The travel magazine, Tabi, began publication in 1924 and, to quote Akai, “travel 
for the sake of travel” became widespread.59 In this context, the national railway lay the 
foundations of its express and long-distance rail transportation system. Furthermore, along 
with efforts to attract international tourists, national rail authorities encouraged the new 
middle class—which developed following the Russo-Japanese War—to travel to tourist 
attractions throughout Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria, and other formal and informal 
territories of the empire. In this way, the national rail network emerged out of a business 
approach to the management of rail transportation, and this helped orchestrate the interwar 
tourism boom. 
In the 1930s, due to events such as the Manchuria Incident of September 1931 and 
withdrawal from the League of Nations in February 1933, Japan’s international isolation 
grew, and right-wing imperialist movements including the Kokutai Meichō Undō 国体明徴
運動 made ground. The Ministry of Railways—at a meeting of regional rail passenger leaders 
at the end of 1935—encouraged pilgrimage to sacred places (seichi junrei 聖地巡礼) through 
measures such as providing a 30 percent reduction for private travelers visiting mausolea 
of successive emperors or Shinto shrines.60 The timetable revision of 1 July 1937 led to the 
further development of a rail transportation system oriented towards business objectives. 
However, the situation changed dramatically following the outbreak of the second 
Sino-Japanese War on 7 July 1937. The use of the rail network for military transportation 
increased considerably, and the policy direction of national railways switched from 
promoting travel to supporting national policy. When the second Sino-Japanese War 
expanded into the Asia-Pacific War, and the Wartime Land Transportation State of 
Emergency was declared at the end of 1942, self-restraint in leisure tourism using trains was 
encouraged, and travel for recreation criticized. Restrictions that were imposed, for example, 
on the sale of tickets, laid the foundations for a system of rail transportation in which 
passengers refrained from travel.61 A January 1943 edition of Tabi included the following 
opinions: “The railways are for the war, and should mainly be used by those working in 
official public business, or for the transportation of military supplies and other essential 
goods”; “In these times, we do not have the luxury to conceive of travel as an activity for the 
pleasure of citizens.”62
59 Mori 2010; Akai 2016, p. 5.
60 Mori 2010, p. 84. 
61 Mori 2010, pp. 92–93.
62 Arai 1943. On the strengthening of travel restrictions during this period, see Miyawaki 1997.
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Takaoka and Ruoff have argued that, while national rail policy changed direction 
to support military objectives following the outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese War, 
the tourism boom continued even into the 1940s through pilgrimage to sacred sites, 
alpine walking, hiking, and other leisure practices.63 However, this paper has shown 
that the beginning of all-out war in China triggered a rapid shift in the management of 
rail transportation from the business approach that formed in the interwar period to an 
approach focused on supporting national policy. From this time, as Akai and others have 
pointed out, the overt practice of “travel for the sake of travel” disappeared.64 In other 
words, with the second Sino-Japanese War, the tourism boom—centered around the new 
middle class that emerged between the wars—collapsed as the national railway turned away 
from the promotion of leisure travel by train. That is, the wartime tourism explored by 
Takaoka and Ruoff emerged out of the repudiation of “travel for the sake of travel.” 
Of course, while travel, or tourism, seemed to disappear during the war, the reality 
was less simple. A January 1943 edition of Tabi notes that “it is unavoidable that the railway 
restricts passenger transportation. What is troubling, however, is that the world looks 
disapprovingly (hakuganshi suru 白眼視する) on travel for the sake of travel because of this.”65 
Like an underground stream, demand for “travel for the sake of travel,” which provided the 
basis for the interwar tourism boom, continued to flow even as the war situation worsened. 
However, the national railway did not yield to such demands. The limited express, first-
class car, scenic car, sleeper car, and other luxury services were abolished; and, with 
the rescheduling of the timetable in March 1945, the return train between Tokyo and 
Shimonoseki became the only passenger express train remaining in operation.66
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